

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

18 February 1963

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. BUNDY

SUBJECT: Tuesday Luncheon 19 February

I had lunch today with Colonel DeWitt Armstrong, who now belongs to Walt Rostow. He showed me the paper entitled "Some Lessons from Cuba," which I had seen in earlier versions a couple of months ago and which is now scheduled for discussion at the Tuesday luncheon tomorrow. He tells me that you, like the other participants, will have received your copy of the basic paper by now.

Attached are thermofaxes of two supplemental papers which you may find time to glance over, perhaps enroute to the meeting tomorrow. ~~But~~ first, as the title indicates, is a draft NSAM on the basic subject. Armstrong himself feels that, if the idea of an NSAM is approved, it could well consist of only the first paragraph of the attached draft. However, both Walt and Harry Rowen wanted to have the "principal criteria" spelled out.

The second attached paper, a single sheet, consists merely of an additional thought for insertion some place into the basic paper.

L. J. LEGERE

13 Feb 63

IN DRAFT FORM

(To be looked upon Presidential approval of "Some Lessons from Cuba")

The Cuba crisis in October 1962 showed the effectiveness of the controlled and graduated application of integrated political, military, and diplomatic power. I would like the US to be prepared to use its power in similarly integrated and graduated fashion wherever that is possible in other crisis situations. To ensure that we can do so if we choose, the Secretaries of State and Defense will conduct an interdepartmental review of all contingencies involving a reasonable likelihood of the use of armed force. The purpose will be threefold: (a) to determine whether our existing plans provide such a flexible capability; (b) to develop plans and to propose changes to give us this capability; and (c) to make any organizational proposals deemed appropriate to carry out this task.

The principal criteria for judging our plans are listed below. They cannot, of course, be applied with complete uniformity to widely dissimilar situations. Since actually unfolding events will inevitably differ from the foreseeable, the common theme is upon maximizing our ability to anticipate effectively toward national objectives.

1. Flexibility. A variety of options should be open to us, pre-planned to the extent reasonably possible. Our plans should be able to accommodate unexpected moves by the other side and not be tied to a single reaction by the opponent.

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b. Isolated resources. We should be able to increase by increments the overall pressure on the opponent. Maximum opportunity for us to control the nature and pace of escalation should be sought. We should be able to make the fullest use of non-military means of reaching our objectives. We should avoid being tied to any automatic series of activities that would carry the situation along faster or slower than seemed best in the event.

c. Integration of overall resources. Political, economic, diplomatic, psychological, and military actions should be concerted with a view to their combined effect upon progress toward our overall objective. Both in the earlier stages, where it is easier for the opponent to back down, and in the later stages where more dangerous decisions are likely to be imminent, our activities must be thoroughly integrated in the light of their overall impact upon the opponent's lineups. The political guidance provided as a foundation for military contingency planning should be as complete as possible and deal adequately with foreseeable alternatives.

d. Control. Communications arrangements and the assignment of responsibilities must permit the integrated use of overall resources. We do to make that decisions must be uniformly understood, and the necessary information must swiftly reach the centers of decision. Our plans should not depend for their success upon perfect performance of communications systems.

e. Intelligence. Both an adequate foundation of prior intelligence information and arrangements for swift acquisition and processing

of accurate cryptic intelligence should be provided.

4. Intelligence and Information. The need to reward allies and to coordinate national activities with those of international organizations and individual allied governments should be recommended in our planning. Where prior preparations are possible, they should be made. Communications and control arrangements must exist for needs to keep other governments and organizations informed.

The factor by which our alternative actions should be judged is how much time they give the opponent to react. A sudden action by us may be over so quickly that he could react only afterward, and at his own pace. Preparatory actions by us, however, might force him to decide quickly, before we take the step we are preparing. The pace of our preparations and of our sequence of escalation can determine the time he has for deciding. To give the opponent time to decide deliberately has the advantages of reducing the chance for mistaken understanding of our actions or of the ultimate implications of his continuing the reaction; it has the disadvantage of allowing him to explore ways of countering our steps and also to take physical steps to improve his capabilities. While in general we probably should choose, from among alternatives of comparable effectiveness, those giving the opponent time to consider his reaction, only the actual circumstances can show whether this approach is really in our interests.

18 Feb 63

ISA DRAFT NSAM

(To be issued upon Presidential approval of "Some Lessons from Cuba")

The Cuba crisis in October 1962 showed the effectiveness of the controlled and graduated application of integrated political, military, and diplomatic power. I would like the US to be prepared to use its power in similarly integrated and graduated fashion wherever that is possible in other crisis situations. To ensure that we can do so if we choose, the Secretaries of State and Defense will conduct an inter-departmental review of all contingencies involving a reasonable likelihood of the use of armed force. The purpose will be threefold: (a) to determine whether our existing plans provide such a flexible capability; (b) to develop plans and to propose changes to give us this capability; and (c) to make any organizational proposals deemed appropriate to carry out this task.

The principal criteria for judging our plans are listed below. They cannot, of course, be applied with complete uniformity to widely dissimilar situations. Since actually unfolding events will inevitably differ from the foreseeable, the common theme is upon maximising our ability to extemporize effectively toward national objectives.

Flexibility. A variety of options should be open to us, pre-planned to the extent reasonably possible. Our plans should be able to accommodate unexpected moves by the other side and not be tied to a single reaction by the opponent.

Graduated pressure. We should be able to increase by increments the overall pressure on the opponent. Maximum opportunity for us to control the nature and pace of escalation should be sought. We should be able to make the fullest use of non-nuclear means of seeking our objectives. We should avoid being tied to any automatic series of activities that would carry the situation along faster or slower than seemed best in the event.

c. Integration of overall resources. Political, economic, diplomatic, psychological, and military actions should be concerted with a view to their combined effect upon progress toward our overall objective. Both in the earlier stages, where it is easier for the opponent to back down, and in the later stages where some dangerous decisions are likely to be imminent, our activities must be thoroughly integrated in the light of their overall impact upon the opponent's leaders. The political guidance provided as a foundation for military contingency planning should be as complete as possible and deal adequately with foreseeable alternatives.

d. Control. Communications arrangements and the assignment of responsibilities must permit the integrated use of overall resources. Who is to take what decisions must be uniformly understood, and the necessary information must swiftly reach the centers of decision. Our plans should not depend for their success upon perfect performance of communications systems.

e. Intelligence. Both an adequate foundation of prior intelligence information and arrangements for swift acquisition and processing

of current crisis intelligence should be provided.

f. Consultation and Coordination. The need to consult Allies and to coordinate national activities with those of international organizations and individual Allied governments should be accommodated in our planning. Where prior preparations are possible, they should be made. Communications and control arrangements must meet our needs to keep other governments and organizations informed.

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ISA DRAFT

One factor by which our alternative actions should be judged is how much time they give the opponent to react. A sudden action by us may be over so quickly that he could react only afterward, and at his own pace. Preparatory actions by us, however, might force him to decide quickly, before we take the step we are preparing. The pace of our preparations and of our sequence of escalation can determine the time he has for deciding. To give the opponent time to decide deliberately has the advantages of reducing the chance for mistaken understanding of our actions or of the ultimate implications of his continuing the conflict; it has the disadvantage of allowing him to explore ways of countering our steps and also to take physical steps to improve his capabilities. While in general we probably should choose, from among alternatives of comparable effectiveness, those giving the opponent time to consider his reaction, only the actual circumstances can show whether this approach is really in our interests.